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THE CONTENTS OF COVENANTS IN LEASES.
FN determining what covenants in a lease will run so as to be
nforceable by or against the assignee of the lessee or lessor, the
formula that has been consecrated to this problem is that the
covenant 'must affect the nature, quality, or value of the thing
demised or the mode of occupying it'. This phrase, which was
used by Lord Ellenborough in Congleton v. Patlieon,I is an expansion
of the statement in Spencer's case 2 that such a covenant must
'touch or concern the thing demised'. A second statement not so
frequently quoted is that of Best J. in 77yvyan v. Arturs that 'if
it be beneficial without regard to his continuing owner of the
estate, it is a mere collateral. covenant upon which the assignee
cannot sue'. The purpose of this article is to examine the various
covenants that have been held to be embraced within one or both
of these two generalizations and to show that these covenants are
in reality of three different species, each having its own legal
characteristics. As a preliminary observation, it must be noted
that the question as to what phraseology must be used in order to
make a covenant run, the further question of whether, if a covenant
is of a sort that may run it must run, or may if the parties so elect
nevertheless be made purely personal, will not be considered; nor
will the covenants for title be taken up.
The formula that a covenant runs if it affects the nature,
quality, or value of the thing demised or the mode of occupying it,
as giving a practical rule for settling whether any given covenant
does or does not run, is a priori open to two objections. First, it
is vague; the words 'nature or quality' are not terms that have
a legal meaning: they are popular merely; the phrase 'thing
demised' may include only the physical corpus, or it may include
the estate; the latter part of the formula is fairly definite, but it is
applicable only to a portion of the covenants that have in fact been
held to run. Second, the key words of the statement, i. e. the
terms 'nature, quality, and value', are more or less question
begging, particularly the word 'value'; if a given covenant runs
1 (x8o8) zo East 130. 2 (1583) 5 Co. 16 a. 3 (x823) 1 B. & 0. 410.
4 No attempt will be made to cite al the cases of covenants. Collections of these
cases will be found among other places in Sims, Real Covenants, nio; i Smith's
Leading Cases, 9 th ed., 185 and if.; Foa, Landlord and Tenant, 4th ed.i 417 and It
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it will affect the value of the thing demised, if it does not it will
not so affect it; but this fact is of no assistance in determining
the primary question: this same objection in a less palpable way
applies to the other two words. Without consuming more time
in pointing out the unsatisfactoriness of the formula as a working
rule, it will be more profitable to proceed to an analysis of the
cases that have generally been said by the courts to be within the
scope of this rule.
It is liut repeating familiar learning to call attention to the fact
that what is for the sake of brevity referred to as ' title' in land
embraces various rights and duties. This is true both of the lessor's
title and the lessee's title. Taking up the title of the lessee, it
may be pointed out that he has certain rights in the strict sense
with correlative duties on the part of those against whom the
rights exist, including among others the lessor: no further express
mention will be made of these rights, it being understood that the
conclusions hereinafter arrived at with respect to the rights next
to be considered will also be true as a matter of principle with
respect to the rights (in the strict sense) good against the lessors.
-In addition, with these rights with their correlative duties the
lessee has also those rights, in the loose sense, that are more
exactly defined as permissive rights" or privileges 2 -i. e. there are
certain courses of action which, because he is the owner in a
qualified sense, of the land, he may pursue without violating the
rights of other persons: he is under no duty to engage in these
actions; he may legally do so if he wishes. Thus he may till the
land in whole or in part, he may build on it, engage in business on
it, sell his interest in it, and perform various other acts upon it or
with respect to it.
A covenant that restricts him in the exercise of any one or more
of these privileges constitutes a direct contractual limitation upon
the totality of legal rights that he would otherwise be free to
exercise with respect to the demised premises, and where the
covenant creates a restriction on a privilege of action as to the
actual physical corpus it is clear that such a covenant does in the
most literal sense affect ' the thing demised'. The propriety of
holding such a covenant to run is obvious. It can have no
significance save as it applies to the tenant in possession of the
premises. Hence it is well settled that covenants of this sort will
bind the assignees of the lessee. Among the covenants to refrain
I Terry, Anglo-American Law, pp. 90, 370 ; Salmond, Jurisprudence, 2nd ed.,
p. ig, expresses the same idea by the term ' liberty'.
This term is used by Professor Hohfeld in an article in 23 Yale L. 3., pp. 16, 32.
The term seems to be fully As expressive as either of the other two and more in
accord with judicial usage, and it has been used throughout this article.
(No. OXIX-
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from acting which have been held enforceable by the lessor against
the assign of the lessee are the following: to let part of the land
lie fallow every year 1 ; not to use for a particular business, 2 not
to conduct the business in a specified way,3 not to remove the
fixtures,4 not to sell off the wood. 5
Take now the same kind of covenant made not by the lessee but
by the lessor. The privileges with respect to the land possessed by
the reversioner are much fewer than those of the lessee, but the
same principle should, apply. A covenant by the lessor that under
certain circumstances the lessee may remain in the demised
premises after the expiration of his lease is a eovenant of this sort
and has been held binding on the lessor's assignee,8 and there can
be no doubt on principle that the same would be true of a covenant
by the lessor not to enter and distrain for rent.
Reverting once more to a further analysis of the various rights.
embraced in the conception of title, it should be noted that in.
addition to his privileges with respect to the physical corpus of
the demise the lessee has certain other rights in the loose sense,
more exactly designated as powers 7 or facultative rights,8 i. e. the
de facto legal ability to affect those legal rights and relations
which he has as lessee. This affecting may be done either direetly,
as where the lessee mortgages or assigns or subleases; or it may
be done indirectly by taking steps which will create this power in
I Cockson v. Cock (1607) Cro. -Tac. 125.
2 Doe d. Bish v. Keeling (1813) i M. &S. 95; Doe d. Gaskell v. Spry (I8I8) i B. & Ald.
617; Do Forest v. Byrne (1856) 1 Hilt (N. Y.) 43 ; Cle nt v. Weles (i865) L. R. x Eq.
2ro; Rolls v. Miller (1884) L R. 27 Ch. D. 7r; Hall v. Ewin (1887) I X. 37 Ch. D. 74
(injunctions against sublessees).
2 Crowe v. Biley (90oo) 63 Ohio St. r ; Granite Co. v. Greene (1904) 25 R. . 586;
American Strawboard Co. v. Hademn Payer Co. (1897) 83 Fed. 619; Wertheimer v.
Judge (i89o) 83 Mich. 56; Stees v. Kranz (1884) 32 Minn. 313; last two casee
injunctions against sublessees. In Congleton v. Pattison (18o8) io East iso, a cove-
nant by the lessee for himself and assigns that no persons should be allowed to
work in the demised mill until a certificate of their settlement should be given the
lessor was held not to be enforceable by the lessor againstthe assignee of the lessee.
For comment on this case see post, p. 333. For other cases involving the same point
as those already cited seeyost, p. 333"
4 Re Brick Co. (1920) 279 Fed. 525.
5 Ferylan&l v. Wright (1840) 23 Wend (N. Y.) 5o6; Contra: Lybbe v. Hart (2883)
29 Ch. D. 8, 29. This conflict is one of construction, not of principle. It is
necessary to note whether the covenant purports to limit the privileges that belong
to the tenant as the holder of the leasehold estate or as the owner of personal
property. The latter kind of covenant is purely personal. Thus a covenant not to
cut down the trees is a limitation upon the privileges of the lessee as owner for the
time being of the soil, and should bind his assigns; a covenant not to sell off cut
trees lying in the yard is on its face a covenant restricting a privilege belonging
to the tenant as owner of a chattel. The Court in the New York case construed the
covenant as really meaning that the lessee should not sever the growing timber
from the premises by permitting it to be cut.
SCallan v. McDaniel (1882) 72 Ala. 96. See also Batchlder v. Dean (x844) 16 N. H.
265.
See Salmond, Jurisprudence, 2nd ed., a. 76.
See Terry, Anglo-American Law, p. ioo.
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some third person: that may ba done voluntarily, as where the
lessee gives a third person a power of attorney to assign or
sublease; or it may be done involuntarily, as where the lessee
engages in a course of action that causes him to be adjudged
a bankrupt. With these powers there normally exists in the lessee
the privilege of exercising them. The privilege of exercising one
or more of these powers may be restricted by covenant in precisely
the same way as the privileges with respect to the physical corpus
of the lease. Such a covenant will bind the assignee of the lessee
for the reasons already pointed out, viz. it can be operative only as
it affects the tenant for the time being. It, constitutes a contractual
restriction of the use not of the physical corpus but of the estate.
Such covenants are universally held to come within the usual
phrase.and to ' affect the thing demised'. In other words, the term
I thing demised' must be held to include not only the land but the
estate in the land. The most common illustration of this type is
the covenant not to assign or sublease without the consent of the
lessor.' The same principles apply to a covenant not to suffer the
obtaining of a prescriptive right against the leased property,2 and
to a proviso for re-entry in case of bankruptcy.3
. C'orresponding covenants by the lessor may be either to restrict
the exercise of the lessor's powers with respect to the estate of the
lessee or to restrict the exercise of his powers with respect to his
reveisionary estate. A covenant that under certain circumstances
he would not enter and forfeit the lease would be a covenant of the
first sort. 4  This same principle would also seem applicable to
a covenant by the lessor not to do an act that would give a third
person the power to enter and forfeit the estate. Such a situation
is suggested by the case of Dewar v. Goodman,6 but it was nt
directly involved and hence was not discussed by the Courts.
A covenant by the lessor that under certain circumstances the rent
should be reduced, is a covenant that limits not the powers but the
rights of the lessor in his reversionary estate. Such a covenant
1 Winliams v. Earle (868) L R. 3 Q. B. 739; Brolaskey v. Hood, 6 Phila. 193.
2 In Wiliams v. Earle (supra) it is stated by way of dictum that while a covenant
not to assign without the consent of the lessor will run, a covenant not to assign
will not run. If this means that as a question of fact it may fairly be inferred from
the form of the covenant that since the parties did not intend that the covenant
should run because they did not contemplate the possibility of assignment, it is
sound. If it means that as a matter of law such a covenant cannot run it seems
unsound.
s Doe d. Br*dgman v. David (1834) 1 C. M. & R. 4o5 ; compare Horsey v. Steiger,
[18993 2 Q.B.D. 79.
4 BaUy v. Wels (1769)3 Wil 25.
Compare Bamford v. Hayley (ixo) 12 East 464.
This case is considered at length, post, pp. 329, 336, 337.
[No. CXIX.
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also runs.' The most common illustration of a covenant restricting
the powers of the lessor with respect to his reversionary estate is
a covenant by the lessor to renew or extend the lease. Such a
covenant is everywhere held to run both against the assignees of
the reversion and in favour of the assignees of the lease.2 The
American cases hold the same way as to the covenant by the lessor
to convey the fee.3 In England it has, after some uncertainty,
finally been held by the Court of Appeal 4 that such a covenant is
personal. So fax as the relation to the lessor's estate is concerned,
both covenants are identical in that they limit the lessor's privilege
of exercising his powers with respect thereto. These cases perhaps
involve another principle and will be subsequently considered.5
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it follows that back of the
loose phrase 'nature, quality, or value of the thing demised' there
is a perfectly clear-cut conception: viz. that of covenants restricting
the privileges and powers of either lessee or lessor as such. There
remains for examination a large number of covenants by the lessor
or lessee that cannot be disposed of on the principles above set
forth. An attempt to settle in general the question of the running
of these widely varying covenants now to be considered by the
classical formula reveals its lack of definiteness even more markedly
than do the cases already discussed. Some of the covenants of
the class now to be considered present no difficulty. The following
covenants by the lessor have been held to enure to the assignee
of the lessee: to rebuild 6 or repair 7 or plant 8 the premises; to
supply water 9 or heat'10 Of these covenants it may be said that
they call either for action by the lessor upon the demised premises
or at least for action that will be physically manifest upon those
premises and hence may be said in a very palpable way to touch
or concern them. This criterion, however, will not apply to Sin#pos
v. Clayton." In that case A was tenant under a lease for three
W'hite v. Southmnd Hote Coc. [1897] 1 Ch. 767; Allen v. Culver (1846) 3 Denio (N. Y.)
2 v. Soney (158) And. 82; Hyde v. kinner (723) 2 P. Williams. 6;
Cookc v. Jones (1894) 96 Ky. 283; Leomnter Gas Co. V. Hilkrf (1908) 197 Maus. 267;
McClintock v. Joyner (igoo) 77 Miss. 678.
3 Blakeman v. Miler (1902) 136 Cal. 138; Holander v. Ma Co. (19o8) 1O9 Md. 131;
Bocland Lime Co. v. Leary ( rx) 2o3 N.Y. 469; Hagar v. Budck (1872) 4Vt. 85.
4Woodal v. Clifton [1905] 2 Ch.. 257; compare Be Kensington Vestry (1883) 24 Ch.
D. 199 ; (1884) 27 Ch. D. 394- Whether such a covenant, assuming it to be good
so far as the principles here being discussed are concerned, would be bad as violating
the policy expressed in the rule against perpetuities, is not within the scope of this
article.
5 Post, p. 334. Pike v. BeaTy Co. (i910) 179 Fed. 97.
7 Gere bek v. Lord (1869) 33 N.J. L. 240 ; Myers v. Burns (z866) 35 N. Y. 269.
8See Eodes v. Mills [I898] A. C. 36o.
9 Jourdain v. Wilson (1821) 4 B. & Aid. 266.
10 Storandt v. Fogel & Binder Co. (x91o) 24o N.Y. App. Div. 671. Compare Jones v.
Powers (1895) 163 Mass. 564.
11 (1838) 4 Bing. N. C. 758-
VOL. XXX. z
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lives, he subleased part of the premises to X for sixty years and
covenanted that -if the head lease ran out first he would use his
utmost endeavours to get it renewed. This covenant was held to
run to X's assignee, and rightly, but it is only in a loose way that
it can be said to relate to the sublease; so far as its subject-matter
goes, it is rather the head lease.
The same difficulty exists with respect to covenants by the lessee.
Those that call for action upon the demised premises may be said
,without difficulty to 'touch or concern the thing demised'. Such
are covenants to build on the demised premises,' to live upon
them,2 to keep them in repair,3 to sink oil wells in them,4 to
consume and spread on the land as manure all hay raised thereon. 5
Compare, however, with these covenants the covenant by the
lessee to keep the premises insured. If by statute the lessor can
avail himself of the proceeds of the policy to apply in rebuilding, 6
or if the policy is to be taken in -he name of the lessor for the
time being 7 the covenant runs; a mere covenant to insure does
not.8 No one presumably would question the soundness of this
distinction, yet so far as the covenants per se are concerned both
touch or concern the thing demised; they both call for the taking
out of a policy upon the premises. Reference may also be made to
Samp on v. Eaetekr. 9  The facts in that case were these: A owned
certain veins of minerals, the adjacent soil being owned by a third
person; A apparently had a right to erect a mill theron. A leased
the veins to X for a term of years and X covenanted to build an
ore mill upon adjacent land which was not included in the demise.
The owners of the vein had, however, the right to remove such
buildings. One would have difficulty in saying that this covenant
related to-the nature, quality, or value of the demised veins of ore:
yet the covenant was held to run to the assignee of the reversion.'0
The question now is this, is there any legal principle which runs
through these cases and the others presently to be considered, not
merely as a matter of coincidence, but as furnishing the ratio deci-
dendi upon which, consciously or otherwise, the courts have pro-
I Anon. (1584) Moore z59. 2 Taem v. Chaplin (1793) 2 H. Bl. I33.
s Dean of Windsor's case (26o) 5 Co. 24 a; Tilny v. Norris (702) i Salk. 309.
4 Bradford 0 Co. v. Blair (1886) 3 Pa. St. 83.
5 Chapman v. Smith [i9o73 2 Ch. 97. 6 Vernon v. Smith (1822) 5 B. & Ald. x.
7 'asury v. Southwort) (1859) 9 0. St. 341 ; Trust Co. v. Snyder's .Admin. (2896) 76
Fed. 34.
s Compare Reidv. McSrum (1883) 9i N.Y. 42 ; the dictum ofBest J. in Vernon v.
Smith (supra) that such a covenant would ran seems erroneous.
o (1829) 9 B. & C. 505; affirmed (i83o) 6 Bing. 644.
1 It is possible, although the opinions nowhere expressly so state, that the right
to erect a mill upon the adjacent premises was technically appurtenant to the lease
of the veins. In such case it maybe said that the covenant called for the exercise
of a right appurtaenant to t.he physical corpus of the demise and hence in a sense
related to the thing demised.
(No. CXIX.
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ceeded? It is submitted that there is, and a further examination
of the various elements comprised in the conception of title will
show what it is. Allusion has already been made I to some of the
elements involved in this conception; to state it in more detail it
may be said that the person who has title to land has with respect
thereto certain rights in the narrow sense, privileges or permissive
rights, powers or facultative rights, immunities and duties. The
covenants first considered limit some of these rights, privileges, or
powers possessed by the covenantor. The determining characteristic
of the covenants now being considered is that they operate either
to make more valuable some of the rights, privileges, or powers
possessed by the covenantee or to relieve him in whole or in pat
of some of his duties. Or to restate the proposition in a somewhat
less technical form: it will be noticed that the various covenants
last mentioned as running have this characteristic, viz. that the act
called for must operate to the benefit of the holder for the time being
of the lease or reversion as the case may be. That is, the covenant
might have been made to expire by its own terms when the original
covenantee gave up his interest; if the performance is kept up it
is intrinsically of such a nature that the person who will now have
the primary interest in it is not the original covenantee but his
successor in title, and as fast as any person in the chain of title
parts with his title he will, not merely as 'a matter of limitations
created by the language of the deed, but because of what it is that
is to be done, cease to have any direct interest in the doing of that
act. As stated in these general terms, or even in.the more technical
form first given, the principle is liable to misapplication, and it is
therefore advisable before taking up other covenants that deserve
special examination to call attention to certain limitations that are
implicit in the rule as stated but which may be overlooked. The
first is this: where the covenant is of such a nature that the per-
formance of it might equally well be made to enure to the benefit
of any given person, whether owner of an interest in the premises
or not, it is essentially personal, and the agreement of the parties
that the covenant is to enure to the benefit of the tenant or rever-
sioner for the time being should make no difference. The tenant
or reversioner is interested- in the performance of this covenant, not
because of his ownership of the land per 8e, but because he is
persona designata.
The second limitation is this: while it is true that a covenant
of the sort now under consideration will not run unless it operates
to the benefit of the rights of the lessor or lessee as such, the
1 Ante, pp. 320, 321.
Z 9
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converse of this proposition is not true. It is easy to suggest
covenants that will indirectly or mediately operate to the benefit
of the covenantee with respect to his ights as owner of the soil
which clearly do not run. Thus a covenant by a lessor of farm
lands that he will sell for the lessee all grain that shall be raised
on the land and sent to him, would seem clearly to be a personal
covenant. On the other hand, a covenantby the lessor to maintain
windbreaks upon the demised premises would be a real covenant.
Yet both operate to make more valuable the privilege that the
lessee has as owner of the soil of raising grain on it. The difference
between the covenants of course is-and this is fundamental-that
the first covenant operates primarily to benefit the covenantee, not
in the exercise of his privilege as owner of the soil, but in the
privilege that he has as owner of a chattel, of selling it, although
this fact may in turn make more valuable the exercise of the
privilege of raising grain. The second covenant, on the other
hand, operates directly to make more valuable the exercise of the
privilege of raising grain. The application of this distinction may
in any given .case present two difficult questions-one of fact as to
what privilege, power, or duty of the covenantee the covenant was
primarily designed to and does protect, and one of law whether the
privilege, power, or duty in question is one that he has as lessee or
lessor or otherwise. Courts may be expected to differ in the con-
clusions to which they come on one or both of these points. The
rule contended for, however, seems to be justified as a matter of
principle, and to furnish a rational connexion between the covenant
and the title with which it passes as an incident.
Again, it may be pointed out that these covenants that have
been held to run do not always operate exclusively for the benefit
of the covenantee: ifthe premises are mortgaged, for example, the
covenant to keep them insured so that the proceeds are available
for rebuilding, or the covenant to pay the taxes, may be almost as
beneficial to the mortgagee as to the lessor. This, however, may
be admitted without either affecting the soundness of the doctrine
suggested or presenting any difficulty in the application thereof.
Taking up in detail the covenants which involve the principle
just stated, no difficulty is presented by those of the lessee. In
addition to the covenants already discussed' the following have
also been held to run: to pay the taxes on the demised premises 2
and to reimburse for damages caused the demised premises where
1 Ante, p. 324 and following.
2 Salisbury v. Shirley (1884) 66 Cal. 223; Mason v. Smith (188I) i31 Mass. 5o;
Astor v. Hoyt(1830) 5 Wend. (N.Y.) 6o3. Many cases turn simply upon the question
of what taxes were meant to be thrown upon the lessee; see .Teffreyv. Hde (i871)
L. R. 6 C. P. 24o ; Allum v. Dickinson (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 632.
[No. CXIX.
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the act would not constitute a violation of his duty as tenant1 On
the other hand, the following covenants by the lessee have been
held to be purely personal: a covenant to pay taxes on other
property of the lessor,2 to erect a building on other landd of the
lessor,3 to pay the debts of the lessor.4
The covenants by the lessor other than those already considered 5
while not wholly harmonious in their language, are for the most
part, so far as their results are concerned, in accordance with the
doctrine here contended.for. One important group of such cove-
nants is the covenant to pay for improvements made by the lessee
upon the demised premises. Some of the decisions upon this
covenant rest upon the ground that the covenant does not run
because of failure to mention assigns8 or involve the question
whether the covenant to pay runs after a breach by the original.
covenantor; 7 with these questions we have no'concern. The
circumstances under which this covenant has been held to run vil
be found to be of this sort: there is first a covenant by the lessee
to make the improvement-this covenant will bind the assignee of
the lessee for reasons already discussed. The reciprocal covenant.
by the lessor has this content: it creates in the lessee, because
of the improvements, some kind of interest bther than that which
would be created by the mere lease. This additional real interest
in the demised premises will pass with them to the assignee thereof
and the covenant by the lessor with respect to payment is in
substance, if not in form, a covenant to buy up -or extinguish this
real right. Such a covenant is one, the performance of which-
i.e. the payment-can enure only to the person who has this real
interest to sell, and that person must be the tenant for the time
being. Such are cases wheie the covenant provides that the lessee
may remove the fixtures if the lessor does not pay for them,9 ar
that the lessor will pay or renew the lease for a sfated period,10 or
that the lessee shall have a right to remain in until the payment is
made,'1 or that he shall have a lien upon the property for the value
of the improvements; or, even a mere covenant 'to, purchase' the
I Zart yn v. Williams (1857) z H. & N. 817.
2 Goteer v. Postmaster-General (1887) 57 1. T. R. (N. S.) 527. ee .Tdhy~ T. kdale
(1871) I. R. 6 .P. 2 i40
3Smith v. Arnolcd (1689) 3 Salk. 4. Compare Sampson v. Basterby, ante, p. 324.
4 Hayho v. Buckhurst (1618) Cro. Jac. 38; Dolph V. White (1855) I2 N. Y. 296.]
'Ante, P. 323.
See Etowah v. Wills Valley Co. (1898) 121 Ala. 672; Watson v. Gardner (1887) 119
IlL 312 ; Coffin v. Talman (1854) 8 N. Y. 465.
7 Gardner v. Samuels (1897) 116 CaL 84- See ante, p. 319.
9 Hunt v. Danforth (1856) 2 Curtis (U. S.) 592.
10 Hollywood v. Parish (19o6) 192 Mas. 369; Phillips v. Reynolds (1898) 30
Wash. 374-
11 Batchelder v. Dean (1844) 16 N.H. 265 ; Hazlewood v. Peunacker (x899) (Tex.
Civ. App.) 5o S. W. 199..
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improvements,' since the fair inference from such a covenant is
that the title is to remain in the tenant until payment. Some of the
cases above mentioned contain dicta to the effect that in any case
where there is a covenant by the lessee to make improvements a
covenant by the lessor to pay therefor will run, even though the
lessee has no real right of the sort above mentioned. This is true
only to a qualified degree. The benefit of such a covenant would
run until the improvement had been made by any given tenant,
whether the lessee or his assignee. The covenant is to pay a person
putting improvements upon the land, and that person can be only
a tenant, and the covenant enures to his benefit because he makes
the improvement. But if the situation contemplated by the lease
is that at the expiration thereof allrights of the then tenant in the
premises shall completely determine, a covenant by the lessor to
pay the then tenant for the value of the improvements irrespective
of who put them there is merely a covenant to pay a sum of money
to a person answering a certain description, viz, occupant of the
premises at the moment when the lease expires. Such a covenant
no more benefits the lessee as such than would a covenant by the
lessor to devise his property to the person who answered that
description, and will neither bind the assignee of the lessor nor
enure to the assignee of the lessee.2 There are two factors that
may exist in this latter case which involve legal principles totally
different from those now being discussed. Admitting that this
covenant does not enure to the assignees of the lease, the original
lessee may assign to the assignee of the lease all his CQntract right
against the original covenantor, and the assignee may be able to
avail himself of this either by set-off or otherwise: again, this fact
or the fuither fact that the assignee has in good faith put the
improvements upon the premises may give him relief upon quasi-
contractual grounds, either against the original lessor or his
assignee. These considerations are quite outside the scope of this
article.3
It is commonly stated by the text writers that a covenant to
indemnify is collateral. In some cases this is undoubtedly true.
Thus, a covenant by or in favour of a third person not a party to
the lease would not come within the Statute of Covenants of
32 Hen. VIII, ch. 34, or corresponding modern statutes, and could
1 Yrerc k v. Caialan (I875) 40 Ia. 311.
2 Gardner v. Samuds (1897) zz6 Cal. 84; Wilooz v. Xehoe (igo) r24 Ga. 484;
Bream v. Dickerson (384o) 2 Humph. (21 Tenn.) 126; conra: StocWeU v.Howard
(1870) 34 Md. 121; semlc: Lametti v. Anderson (3826) 6 Cow. (N.Y.) 3o; see ante,
P'See Canover v. Smith (1864) 17 N.J. F4. 5 ; Ecke v. Feloer (1886) 65 Wis. 5;
Berrie v. Woods (3887) 12 Ont. Rep. 693.
[No. CXIXo
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be only a personal contract.' So a covenant that purported to
indemnify against loss or damage to other than the rights possessed
by the covenantee as tenant of the leasehold would also be col-
lateral. Another application of the same limitation would be in
a case where A leased to X and made a covenant which would not
run, either because it was intrinsically collateral or because proper
phraseology was not used, and A then made a second covenant to
indemnify X against all breaches of covenants contained in the
lease. Such a covenant would not run against the assigns of A or
to the assigns of X; to hold otherwise would render it possible in
substance to make all kinds of covenants run. Compare with
these cases, however, the following: A leases to M, who covenants
for himself and- assigns to build a house on the demised premises;
the lease gives a right of re-entry for breach. X subleases to X
and covenants, not for his assigns, to observe and perform or
indemnify .X from the proviso and covenants in the head lease to
be performed by the mesne lessee or assigns. Massigns to N, who
does not perform; A enters and evicts X. Held, that X has no
right of action against N.2
So far as the covenant to build was concerned, N was under.no
obligation to X in that regard, the assigns not being mentioned,
and a covenant to indemnify for 4 breach of that covenant clearly
would not run. On the other hand, a covenant by M that he
would so perform the conditions of the head lease that the sublessee
should not be evicted, should bind M'8 assignee N. Admitting that
N would be under no obligation to X to- perform the covenant to
build, N was under such an obligation to the head lessor in that
regard that the non-performance of the covenant might- be, if the
head lessor chose to enforce the forfeitur ,3 of direct consequence to
Walsh v. Fussel (1829) 6 Bing. 163; see Wash v. Packard (x896) z65 3am x8&
2 Doughly v. Bowman (1848) 11 Q. B. 4.44.
3 It was suggested .on similar facts in ewarv. Goodman x9o7] x I-. 62i that
the fact that the head lessor might not elect to take advantage of the breach by
the mesne lessee to enter and terminate the estate of the sublessee showed that the
covenant affected the thing demised only in respect of collateral circumstances;
This suggestion seems irreconcilable with the position taken by the Court of Appeal
in Horsey v. Steiger [x899] 2 Q.B. 69. In that case a lease contained a proviso for
re-entry if the lessee should go into liquidation. A corporation, the assignee of the
original lessee, went into voluntary liquidation proceedings for the purpose of
effecting a reorganization. The Court pointed out the difference between bankruptcy
and liquidation proceedings, viz. that the latter, unlike the former, do not neces-
sarily involve a dealing with the title ; the result of the liquidation proceedings is
not per se to vest the title in the liquidator, but merely to give him the power to
dispose of the title if in his discretion it shall become necessary so to do. The
proviso was held, nevertheless, to be enforceable against the assignee of the lessee,
providing proper statutory notice of an intent to enforce the forfeiture was given.
' It is sufficient if... the act relied upon will in the ordinary course of events
involve dealing with the interest in or possession o4 the premises' (Foa, Tanlord
and Tenant, 4th ed., 421). This seems sounder than the view suggested in the
Dewer case : if the landlord does not enforce the forfeiture this goes to the question
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the sublessee in that the right of the sublessee in the demised
premises would thereby be terminated. A covenant by the mesne
lessee to indemnify aginst damages resulting from the breach of
this last-mentioned covenant would also run, for it would be in
effect a covenant to make good losses resulting from the breach of
a covenant that would itself be binding upon him in favour of the
-sublessee. There is nothing in the opinion of the Court in
'Doughty v. Bowman to indicate that it would consider that such
a c6venant as this latter would not run. In the actual case the
covenant was a single one-i. e. to indemnify for all breaches of the
terms of the head lease. This would include not only those breaches
which might result in a forfeiture of the sublessee's interest, but
any bresiches which would result in daniage to the sublessee,
whether through forfeiture or otherwise. The Court held that this
covenant could not be split, and, being broad enough to include
breaches that would be collateral as regards the sublessee, it could
not be bold good so far as it related only to breaches.that were not
collateraLY" This is sound; but it should be noticed that the case
cdoes not involve the proposition that a covenant to indemnify is
for that reason alone necessarily collateral 2
Whether a covenant by the lessor not to compete with the lessee
is more than personal, is a point upon which there is division of
authority. In TMoma8 v. Haywood 3 it was held that a covenant by
the lessor not to open a house for the sale of spirits within a mile
of the tavern leased to X was not enforceable by X's assignee. On
substantially the same facts the opposite conclusion was reached in
-orms v. WeZ& 4  Applying to these cases the principles already
suggested as underlying this group, the first question would be as
to the nature of the right protected by the covenant. It is clearly
a privilege belonging to the lessee as such; it is not the mere selling
of liquor that is protected, that privilege he has as owner of the
chattel; it is the privilege of selling liquor in this particular place.
That he has only because he is the owner for the time being of that
place. Thus far there is no difference between the covenant in
question and a covenant by the lessor not to build, on an adjacent
of damages, but the possibility that in a given case he may not elect to enforce his
lights has very little bearing on the question whether the covenant is or is not
adapted to the protection of the covenantee in his rights as lessee.
L I If the covenant declared upon presents as alternative, it is merely a covenant
to indemnify. Is that then ad idem with a covenant for quiet enjoyment, assuming
that that covenant would pass? It is not. It might be broken in other ways than
a covenant for quiet enjoyment, and is therefore larger. And it cannot be split
merely because one breach of it may affect the estate, while the other is collateral.'
Parke B. 11 Q.B. 454
2 Dougldy v. Bonman was followed in Yewr v. Geodnan, ante.
3 (x86 9 ) L.B 4 E. 1x.
' (1837) 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 136.
[No. C IX.
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piece in such a way as to darken the rooms in the lessee's house.1
Both covenants tend to render more valuable the lessee's privileges
of action upon the demised premises. The latter covenant clearly
would enure to the benefit of the lessee's assignee. Why not the
former?
While the privileges protected by both covenants must in the
last analysis be expressed in terms of human action, as must all
rights, there is this difference between them: the privileges pro-
tected by the covenant not to build may be said to be exercised
by the lessee merely as a human being for the enjoyment of his
personal physical needs of air, light, quiet, and the like: the privi-
leges protected by the covenant not to compete are exercised by
the lessee because so doing enures in a larger or smaller degree not
to his physical benefit as a human being, but to his financial benefit
as a seller of liquor. This difference may be more briefly and
somewhat metaphorically expressed by saying that one covenant
enures to the physical benefit of the land, the other to its financial
benefit.2 Whether a distinction should be made between covenants
that enure to the benefit of privileges that have their value for the one
or the other reason is a point upon which Courts may reasonably
differ. It should be noticed, however, that in Thomag v. Haywood
and Noman v. Fel. the question at issue was merely as to whether
the benefit of the covenant ran to the assignee of the lessee as
against the original covenantor. The question of the running of
the burden presents a different problem that will be subsequently
considered.3 Furthermore, even assuming that the burden of such
a covenant should not run in a conveyance of the fee, it should be,
noticed that there is a marked difference between an attempt to tie
up land in perpetuity and the restriction given by the lessor for
the term of an ordinary short term lease.
To restate, in a word, the characteristics of the two g&oups into
which the covenants that have been examined are divisible, it may
be said that the reason why the first kind of what are essentially
contract relations will pass with a conveyance of the title, the bond
that connects them with the land, is found in the nature of the
burden created by the covenant. It is fundamentally a limitation
upon rights that form a part of the title to the land. As to the
second group, the basis of its connexion with the land is in the
character of the benefit conferred. It is fundamentally a benefit to
the person who has the title and in respect of the title. There
remains for consideration this question: if the obligation imposed
1 See -icketts v. Enfiled Churchwardens [909] I Ch. 544 Post, p. 336.
2 See Holmes 3. in Norcross v. Javmes (i855)i4o Mass. 88.
s See post, p. 335, and following.
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by the covenant limits the real rights of the covenantor so that the
burden of it will pass to his assignee, is it necessary in order that
the rights under that covenant should pass to the assignee of the
covenantee that it should benefit him with respect to the real
rights that he has as such assignee? A similar question may be put
as to covenants of the second class, or the whole problem may be
more generally stated thus: if either the burden or the benefit of
a covenant has the connexion with the title outlined above, will
both ends of the -ovenant run or will each end run only as it has
this connexion?
Taking first those covenants where the connexion with the title
is found in the nature of the burden thereby created, it will be
remarked that many of those covenants that limit the lessee in
the exercise of his privileges or rights as lessee do in fact
necessarily satisfy both these requirements. It is not universally
true, however, and whether it is true in any given ease may depend
upon the question of fact as to the lessor's motive in taking the
covenant. Thus, suppose A leases to X a shop and takes a covenant
from X that he will not use the shop for the sale of liquor. A may
take this covenant because he believes that the use of the premises
for a dram-shop will make his reversionary interest worth less, or
because he has other property in the neighbourhood that will be
depreciated in value by the existence of a dram-shop, or because he
runs a neighbouring dram-shop, or because he is opposed on principle
to the sale of liquor. On the first supposition he is taking the
covenant in his character as landlord and to protect his reversionary
interest; on the next two suppositions he is taking it to protect his
other premises; and on the last supposition he is taking it for purely
personal reasons entirely unrelated to his ownership of any land."
If now X assigns his lease to Y, A ought to be able to enforce this
covenant against Y. To say that Y takes the title minus this
privilege is to beg the question; this much is certain, however: viz.
that the covenant in question was intended to be an inseparable
limitation upon the freedom of the action of the lessee with respect
to that land. The land was A'8 and if he chose to part with it only
1 The fact that the covenant is incorporated in the lease may fairly raise a pre-
sumption that it was meant to be an integral part of the group of correlative rights
and duties created thereby; and if it is an open question whether the covenant was
taken as an incident to the reversion or otherwise, it ought to be regarded as
belonging legally with the other rights created by the same instrument and pass
with the reversion. Furthermore, A in assigning to B may not only assign to him
his reversionary interest in the premises but in addition thereto his contract rights
against the'lessee. In any of these situations B is entitled, for one reason or the
other, to enforce the covenant. Most of the cases are of this kind. See (Gegg v.
Hands, 44 Ch. D. 503 (1890); White v. Southend Hotel Co. [1897] 1 Oh. 767;
Manchester Brewing Co. v. Coombs [1901] 2 Ch. 6o8.
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subject to this restriction as to its use his motive in creating that
restriction should make no difference. There are several cases in
which it has ben held or stated that a covenant taken by the lessor
obviously for his benefit, not as owner of the reversion but of
another business, is binding upon the assignee of the lessee.'
If now A assigns his reversionary interest to B, it seems clear
that B ought not to be able to enforce this covenant. Ex hypotheri
it was taken not for the benefit of A'8 reversion but for some other
purpose: the fact that it is a limitation on the estate held by X or
his assignee Ywould seem immaterial unless it can be shown that B
has the interest that was intended to be benefited by the covenant.
There is very little authority on the point. In Cegg v. Hand 2 the
judges all agreed that the right to enforce such a covenant did pass,
although they rested the decision on other grounds. Lopes L. J.
said : 3 In my opinion it (the covenant to sell only beer furnished
by the lessor or his assigns) touches and concerns the demised
premises and therefore4 it runs with the reversion.' 5 Thrumton v.
Minke I is a decision the other way. In that case the facts were
these: A owned two parcels of land, on one of which was an hotel.
He leased the other lot to X with a proviso that no building erected
thereon should exceed three stories in height. A later sold the
reversion to B, keeping the hotel parcel A was allowed to enjoin
X against a subsequent attempt to erect on the leased lot a building
of more than three stories. The contention that the benefit of the
proviso passed to the assignee of the reversion was overruled by.
the Court, it finding that the proviso was inserted for the benefit of
A not as lessor but as owner of the hotel lot. This decision, though
purporting to go on equitable grounds, seems also correct as to
the running at law of such a covenant. It is submitted that there
is nothing in the 32 Hen. VIII, ch. 34, properly construed that
1 Uxbridge v. Stavezand (747) 1 Vez. Sr. 56 sembl; Jmes v. Edney (z81a) , Camp.
285; Ckegg v. sands (189o) L.R. 44Ch. D. 5053; W t.Bond7hm41dHodUb.[I897] I Cb.
767; .American Strawboard Co. v. Hademan Paper Co. (1897) 83 Fed. 619.
Congleton v. .Paison (iSo8) lo East Ixo is apparently the only decision the other
way. A leased to X a mill and took a covenant fromZ that no non-parish laboarers
should be employed in the mill who did not have asettlement in some other parish.
Lord Ellenborough held thatthis covenant was not enforceable bythe lessor against
the assignee ofthe lessee. He said-... ' How then does it (the covenant) affect the mode
of occupation ?... The carrying on of a particular trade may do that, but where the
work to be done is at all events the same, whether it be done by workmen by one
parish or another cannot affect the mode of occupation.' This statement is it is
submitted, unsound. A covenant not to employ a particular class of labourers in
a mill is a limitation upon the privileges of the lessee, as such, just as much as
a covenant not to make or sell a particular article on the premises.
2 (189o) 44 Oh. D. 5o3. 3 Ibid., p. 523. 4 My italics.
r Ace. Hamley v. Hendon (1699) 1a Mod. 337 semble. See also Whit& v. Smotdend
Hotel Co. [1897] i Oh. 767; Zetand v. HisWo (1882) 7 App. Cas. (SO.) 42 ; Foa,
Landlord and Tenant, 4th ed., 435.
6 (1870) 32 Md. 487.
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compels the doctrine that if one end of a covenant runs with the
leasehold interest the other must necessarily run with the'reversion.
Just as a leasehold may be burdened with an easement in favour of
another piece of land I so on principle it may be burdened with
a covenant in favour of another piece of land, and the running of
such a covenant would- be determined not by the statute but by
the common law.
Only a few words are needed as to the application of a similar
limitation to the covenants of the lessor. What has been said with
respect to the lessee's covenants is equally applicable, muatIR
mutazdis, to the lessor's covenants. One may go even farther.
The lessee's estate is a subordinate estate; out of the fee simple of
A is carved the smaller estate of X It is derived from A and
hence, as was pointed out,2 any limitation on the rights of that
estate, no matter why imposed, should be enforceable by A personally
against any subsequent taker of the lease. Such of course is not
the relation of A'8 estate to 8X', estate, and hence it may well be
doubted on principle whether even the original covenantee, the
lessee, could enforce as against an assignee of the reversion
a covenant that did not in addition to restricting the rights com-
prised in the reversionary title also operate to the benefit of the
lessee with respect to his rights as such. Practically all covenants
by the lessor do, however, satisfy both these requirements. The
only covenants by the lessor that suggest this question are the
covenants to renew the lease and to convey the fee simple.3 Both
of these are covenants relating to and curtailing the privilege of
exercising powers of the holder of the reversionary interest. A
covenant to renew or extend the lease, technically speaking, can be
of value only to the tenant for the time being because the lease
can be renewed only to the present holder. On the other hand,
a covenant to grant a new lease, if it be taken literally, or a
covenant to sell the fee simple, is a covenant the performance of
which will not enure to the tenant with respect to the rights that
he now has. It is merely a chance to buy an interest in land, and
that chance is substantially as valuable to a person whether or not
he is now tenant. Hence the question whether the covenant is,
under 32 Hen. VIII, ch. 34, real or personal would on principle not
be difficult of answer. Such a covenant would seem clearly personal.
How far the American cases are necessarily in conflict with this
doctrine it is hard to say. Practically all the cases are for specific
performance. So far as the rights of the lessee go he can enforce
his equitable interest against any purchaser of the reversion with
ICo~'s case (x692) i Salk. z96; Newhoffv. Mayo (1891) 48 N. S. Eq. 69.
2 Ante, p. 332. 3 These cases are cited ante, p. 323.
[Nqo. CXIX.
HeinOnline  -- 30 L. Q. Rev.  334 1914
July, 1914.] ne ContentS of Cvenants in Leases.
notice quite aside from the question whether the covenant is real or
personal: so far as the rights of an assignee of the lessee go he will
succeed in his bill for specific performance if he shows that the
original covenantee's rights has been vested in him, and whether
this right has come as a real covenant attached' to the lease or as
a personal claim transferred by some general language of assignment
is ordinarily immaterial. As has already been pointed out1 the
English law now seems to be definitely committed to the doctrine
that such a covenant does not run.
There now remains for consideration the converse of the problem
just discussed, namely: if the covenant enures to the covenantee
in respect of his rights as lessee or lessor so that the benefi6t of the
covenant will pass to his assignee, will the burden pass to the
assignee of the covenantor irrespective of whether it -limits his
rights as owner or imposes an obligation upon him not necessarily
related to the land? Here as elsewhere it should be noticed that
most covenants do in fact satisfy both requirements.
As to covenants by the lessee the answer is clear on the
authorities : if the covenants benefit the lessor with respect to his
reversionary interest they will bind the assignee of the lessee
irrespective of whether or not the covenant limits the lessee's
rights or privileges. The covenants to insure and to pay taxes 2 are
cases of this kind. The rule cah be justified on principle because
of the derivative nature of the lessee's estate, and the fact that
these acts beneficial to the lessor as sugh are in the natureof a
continuing quid pro quo for the land.
Whether the burden of a covenant by the lessor that benefits the
lessee as such should merely for that reason follow the reversion
into the hands of an assignee is more difficult of decision. It is
arguable that the second section of 32 Hen. 8, ch. 34, which gives.
the lessee and his assigns the same rights against the assignee of
the lessor as against the lessor will produce the same result that
follows from the subordinate nature of the lessee's estate in the
situation just considered, and that since the covenant is made byI
the lessor for the purpose of benefiting the lessee's estate it is for
this reason alone within the purview of the statute. So far as-the.
decisions go, those that deal with the liability of the assignee of the.
lessor under these circumstances hold him to be bound.3
Admitting thdt there may be covenants of this sort binding upon
the assignee of the lessor although not affecting his rights or
Ante, P. 323. 2 Ante, pp. 324, 326.
SAnte, p. 326 and following. See also Mansel v. Norton (1883) L. R. I2 Oh. D. 769;
Ger-bek v. Lord (x869) 33 N.T. L. 240; Myers v. Burns (1866) 35 N.Y. 269; Storandt,
v. Vogd and Binder Co. (rgro) 14o N. Y. App. Div. 671.
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privileges as owner of the reversion, there is a further limitation
upon this possibility that should be noticed. The act to be per-
formed by the covenantor may be an act the locus of the performance
of which is a matter of indifference, as a covenant to purchase the
improvements, or it may necessarily be performable on the demised
premises as a covenant to install a heating plant, or it may neces-
sarily be performable upon or the covenant may be to refrain from
performance upon another specified piece of land. The first two
cases present no difficulty once it is admitted that a covenant by
the lessor may bind his assignees even though it does not limit his
reversionary rights. As regards the third case, the fact that the
covenant is performable elsewhere should not affect the running of
the benefit, since that is ex hypotheei connected with the lessee's
estate.' If the lessor assigns the reversion and the other piece to
different persons it becomes necessary to determine in what capacity
the lessor has covenanted. Since he owns both pieces it is con-
ceivable that he should have intended to covenant not as the lessor
but as the owner of the other piece. In such a case the obligations
of that assignee would not come within the scope of 3Z Hen. VIII,
ch. 34, but would depend on common law principles. Since in
England the burden of a covenant will not run at law except
between landlord and tenant 2 the purchaser of the second piece
would not be liable to an action at law; whether he would be
liable in equity would depend on whether the covenant was
negative or affirmative and whether he took with or without
notice.3 Since in the United States the burden of a covenant will
in most jurisdictions ran at law, there would seem no reason on
principle-why such a covenant should not be held binding upon
a purchaser of the burdened piece.4
1 To this effect: Bicce/ts v. Enfleld Churchwardens [i909] i Ch. 544; Morris v.
Kennedy [1896] 2 LB. 247; Norman v. Wells (1837) i7 Wend. (N.Y.) 136, ante, p. 330,
n. 4. Compare Thomas v. Hayward (1869) L. R. 4 Ex. 311, ante, p. 330. In Dewar
v. Goodman, [19o7] I K. B. 612, [19O8] 1 IL B. 94, [i909] A. C. 72, the facts were these:
A leased to 2! on long term lease a tract of land containing 200 buildings with
a covenant by M and upon condition that he should keep the buildings in repair.
M sub-leased two buildings to X taking a covenant from Xto keep the two buildings
in repair and covenanting with .X to perform so much of the covenants and con-
ditions in the head lease as related to the premises not included in the sub-lease.
All the covenants and conditions purported to bind and enure to assigns. A assigned
to B, M to N, and X to Y. N did not keep in repair the buildings not included in
the sub-lease and B entered and re-took possession of the entire tract including the
two buildings of the sub-lease. N was held not liable to Y for breach of covenant.
That the act was not to be performed upon the premises included in the sub-lease
was apparently regarded by some of the judges as determining its character as
a personal covenant even with respect to the benefit.
2 See Austerberry v. Oldham (1885) 29 Ch. D. 750, 780.
3 gfaywood v. Brunswick Building Society (i8si) 8 Q. B. D. 4o3. As to the possi-
bility of the covenant being made binding upon the second piece of land, compare
Kemp v. Bird (1877) 5 Ch. D. 549; .Ashby v. Wilson [9oo] i Ch. 66.
4 In Noonan v. Orton (1870) 27 Wis. 3oo, the Court held the purchaser of the
[No. OXlX.
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If the covenant does not bind the assignees of the other piece it
would seem that the burden would necessarily be personal to the
lessor; to hold the assignees of the reversion upon such a covenant
would be to make them guarantors of the performance of a covenant
over which they have no control. If this be true it would follow
that the fact that the reversion and the second piece were in a given
case both conveyed to the same person should make no difference.
The covenant being in its nature essentially personal, the fact that
the particular assignee of the reversion could legally perform the
covenant because he happened also to be the owner of land upon
which the performance was to be made, would be immaterial. It is
submitted that this is the ground upon which the decision in the
case of .Dear v. Goodman I could most safely have been rested.2
There is a third group of covenants, few in number, to which
reference should be made for the sake of completeness. Those are
the covenants that merely repeat in terms of contract an already
existing obligation running from the covenantor to the covenantee.
The covenant to pay rent is the most obvious illustration of this
type of covenant. Whether historically the covenant to pay rent
is not to be differentiated from the covenants hitherto considered,
raises a different question, but for purposes of the present
classification, it belongs in this third group 8 Another covenant
by the lessee of the same species is the covenant to commit no
waste. A similar covenant by the lessor is the covenant for title
second piece bound by the covenant in favour of the lessee. Compare Taylorv..Owen,
2 Blackf. (Ind.) 30T (1830).
1 Ante, p. 336,n. i.
2 To the same effect is Hebert v. DupatY, 42 IA. Ann. 343 (i89O). Compare Fymyan
V. Arthur (1823) 1 B. & C. 410. In Athol v. R. B. (x868) Ir. Rep. 3 .L. 333, a
covenant by the lessor that the lessee might draw the surplus water from
the lessor's canal was held enforceable by an assignee of the lessee against an
assignee of the lessor of both reversion and canal. Though couched in terms of
covenant, the right created in this case is clearly an easement.
3 See Athoe v. Hennings (16z5) r Rolle 8o, s. c. Bulst. 281. Cases holding the
covenant to pay rent binding on the assignees of the lessee are Sleventzn v. "IYmbard
(1802) 2 East 575; Webs er v. Nicols (1882) 104 IM. 16o; 7ones v. .undrim (1842)
3W. & S. (Pa.) 53r ; so of a rent in kind, Beath v. Barons(185o) r3 Barb. (N. Y.) 3o5.
That the amount of rent is to be fixed by reference to extrinsic transactions does
not affect the running of the covenant; thus: amount of rent fixed by amount of
traffic over railroad, Hemingway v. Fernandws (i842) 13 Sim. 228; Haoings v.
Eastern iy. [1898] 2 Ch. 674; see also KXene- v. Bailey (834) 2 M. & K. 517: fixedby amount of damage done on the land of lessor, Norval v. Pascoe (1864) 34 L. J. Ch.
82: fixed by amount of grain raised on land, Raphoe v. Hawk'sworth (2828) r Huds.
& Br. 6o6: fixed by amount of oil obtained from land, Fennell v. Guffey (289o)
139 Pa. St. 341.
In Yyvynan v. Arthur (1823) i B. & C. 410 the lease contained this clause after the
reddendum, ' doing suit to the mill of the said Thomas (the lessor) his heirs and
assigns... by grinding all such corn there as should grow in or upon the close
demised'. Action was allowed by the assignee of the lessor of both mill and rvver-
sion against the administrator of the lessee for breaches both before and after the
]6ssee's death. Unless the case is to be sustained upon the theory thatthis reserva-
tion amounted to a rent service, it seems wrong.
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that the lessee shall quietly enjoy the demised premises.' This is
the case where the scope of the express covenant is no greater than
the common law liability of the lessor; if it is greater, the covenant
falls in the second group already discussed.
To summarize with respect to the firs ttwo groups-for, as just
pointed out, the third group is zeii generia and requires no comment.
One clean-cut category of covenants, viz, those restricting the real
rights of the lessee, will run with the leasehold under all circum-
stances; a second group, those covenants by the lessee that benefit
the lessor with respect to his reversionary estate, as defined herein,
will run both with the leasehold and with the reversion. Covenants
by the lessee of the first sort ought not to run with the reversion
unless they also satisfy the test of the second group; it is doubtful
if this latter statement represents English law: there seems to be
nothing in the American decisions opposed to it Covenants by the
lessor of the first class will almost universally satisfy, also, the test of
the second class-i.e. benefit the lessee as such; they should be purely
personal unless they do: this is true of the English decisions and
in most cases of the American decisions: if the covenant benefits the
lessee as such the benefit thereof will pass to his assignee; even
though the covenant does not also restrict the estate of the lessor
it.seems clear that the 32 Hen. VIII, oh. 34, or similar American
statutes, will cause the burden of this covenant to pass to the
assignee of the reversion unless the locm of the act is on another
piece of land, in which case, both in this country and in England,
either it binds the assignees of the other piece or is personal to the
lessor.
HARY A. BiGHLOW.
Univermity of C icago Law &ool.
r See also Rahoe v. Hawsworth, supra; Shelton v. Coaman (1849)3 OCsh. (Mas.) 358.
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